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Barriers to labour mobility delay the transition of labour from traditional to new
sectors of economic activity and are an important reason for the failure of devel-
oping countries to catch up with richer ones. Simon Kuznets noted the impor-
tance of such barriers in his influential 1966 book on economic growth when he
wrote, “a high rate of modern economic growth is attainable only if the required
marked shifts in industrial structure are not too impeded by resistance - of labour
and of capital, of people and their resources in the old and accustomed grooves.”
(Kuznets, 1966, 157). This paper is about the role of a particular policy barrier
in China, the hukou system of household registration. It will argue that despite
the large transitions that took place in China over the last three decades, the
hukou registration system has led to lower levels of both industrialization and ur-
banization, and consequently to a bigger share of employment in less productive
agricultural jobs than would have been the case in a more open labour market.
Fast industrialization began in China following Deng Xiaoping’s market reforms
that started in 1978 and has been accompanied by a structural transformation
that saw labour move from agricultural employment in rural areas to industry and
services in predominantly urban areas. Agricultural employment fell from 68% of
total employment in 1978 to 26% in 2010. Many Chinese scholars attribute a large
part of the rise in labour productivity in China over this period to the shift from
low productivity agricultural employment to higher productivity manufacturing
jobs (Brandt and Zhu, 2010, Dekle and Vandenbroucke, 2012). And yet, it could
have gone further. Alwyn Young (2003), who does not include agriculture in
his analysis of productivity growth in China, makes a strong point for the study
of policies that “kept the peasantry tied up in agriculture,” instead of releasing
labour to work in higher productivity activities. Similar conclusions were reached
by others; in a 2005 survey of 17 provinces that account for the vast majority of
Chinese farmers, Zhu et al. (2006) find that after the initial growth of agricultural
incomes in the 1980s, China’s land policies have been largely responsible for a
widening of the income gap between rural and urban households.1 The policies
responsible for these disparities are the subject of this paper.
The large movements of labour from agricultural to non-agricultural activities
(industrialization) and the related movement from rural to urban locations (ur-
banization) are documented in Figure 1.2 Most of the employment growth that
1A summary of results with policy recommendations is available in Zhu and Prosterman
(2007).
2The data in Figure 1 were constructed by Brandt and Zhu (2010). They made two adjust-
ments to the employment data of the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). First, following Holz
(2006), they fixed a major discontinuity in the NBS employment data beginning in 1990. Sec-
ond, they made use of detailed labour supply data for rural households collected by the Research
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attracted agricultural labour was in the urban sector but the rural non-agricultural
sector also expanded, a point that we address in this paper. Despite this transfor-
mation, however, large productivity differences across sectors remain. Productivity
in agriculture is still much lower than it is in non-agricultural jobs, something that
indicates barriers to labour mobility (e.g. Brandt and Zhu, 2010). This kind
of productivity gap between agriculture and non-agriculture is a common feature
of developing countries (Gollin, Lagakos and Waugh, 2014); Vollrath (2009) finds
that the employment misallocation that gives rise to the productivity gap accounts
for a substantial fraction of cross country income differences.3
In this paper we describe the mobility barriers that are embedded in the hukou
household registration system and then formally derive their implications for em-
ployment allocations in a sectoral model of the economy. The hukou registration,
introduced in 1958, initially tied people to their area and job and did not allow
any labour migration at all. Restrictions have been relaxed piecemeal and not
uniformly across the country, but the registration system is still in place and it is
still an impediment to labour mobility. Barriers to mobility from the hukou regis-
tration system arise mainly along two dimensions. First in the use of land, which
is provided free by the state to rural families but tenure rights are not suffi ciently
secured to enable the growth of an effi cient rental market; and second in the pro-
vision of social services such as education and health, which are conditional on
people’s hukou registration and in particular the area in which they are registered.
The analysis of the impact of China’s land policy on migration decisions can
be done in a two-sector model of industrialization, with an agricultural sector that
uses both land and labour and a non-agricultural sector that uses only labour.
The key to our analysis is that land tenures are not guaranteed, so land allocated
to farmers for cultivation may not be renewed when their lease expires or even
taken away by the authorities before it expires. Although a succession of new
laws since the 1980s have aimed to establish more secure tenures, we cite a large
number of studies that find that in practice there is still substantial risk that village
authorities might take land away for reallocation to other farmers. Farmers and
potential migrants are aware of this risk (90% or more say so, even in recent times;
see for example Kimura et al., 2011) so they take it into account when negotiating
rents for the land vacated by migrants. The result, as we show, is that the rental
market clears at a rate below the marginal product of land. In our model the
ratio of the market-clearing rental to the marginal product of land is equal to the
Centre for the Rural Economy to reestimate primary sector employment, in order to address
concerns that the NBS data underestimated the rate of employment decline in this sector.
3Ngai (2004) and Gollin, Parente and Rogerson (2007) reach similar conclusions by showing
that the delay in the transition out of agriculture contributes to cross-country income differences
because it delays the start of modern economic growth.
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probability that the farmer will not lose the land to a reallocation after migration.4
The lower rent leads farmers to underestimate the true opportunity cost of land
in their decision whether to migrate out of agriculture or not and consequently it
leads to over-employment in agriculture. A reform that gives security of tenure to
farmers enables the development of an effi cient rental market for agricultural land
and so induces farmers to fully take into account the opportunity cost of land.5
Social subsidies also work against migration but for different reasons. Subsi-
dies are given to local hukou holders only and they include support for education,
health, pensions and other less important forms of income supplements. In the
early years of industrialization the Chinese authorities encouraged the development
of “township and village enterprises”in rural areas, so that rural residents could
move from agricultural to non-agricultural jobs without leaving the area and so
still be eligible for the local subsidies. In order to deal with the impact of this pol-
icy we extend our model to three-sectors, by introducing a rural non-agricultural
sector, and model the impact of the hukou restrictions on the eligibility for social
subsidies. We show that in contrast to the land policy which affects industrializa-
tion, the main impact of the social transfer policy is to reduce the urbanization of
employment; i.e., it leads to over-employment in rural non-agriculture and under-
employment in urban locations.
We illustrate our results with recent Chinese data and find support for our
claims. Both the land and social subsidization policies contribute to over-employment
in agriculture and under-employment in the urban sector, with much smaller ef-
fects on employment in the rural non-agricultural sector. This over-employment
in agriculture contributes a substantial portion of the observed productivity gap
between agriculture and non-agriculture in China.
In a developing country like China, there are many different reasons that con-
tribute to mobility barriers and to lower productivity in agriculture. Our main
focus in this paper is the household registration system, although in a later sec-
tion of the paper we also consider the implications of an exogenous labour market
wedge, of the kind generally analyzed in the development literature. We find that
although the exogenous wedge has an impact on migration decisions, our analysis
of the impact of the hukou registration on mobility remains as important.
Our analysis parallels that of several other studies that analyse sources of mo-
bility barriers in institutional features of different countries. Caselli and Coleman
(2001) attribute barriers to mobility out of agriculture in the early years of in-
dustrialization in the United States to different educational levels in urban and
rural locations. Hayashi and Prescott (2008) show that the prewar Japanese so-
4In the commonly cited “use it or lose it”case this ratio is zero, as the migrant loses the land
with probability 1.
5Policies that secure land tenure effectively have been advocated by the World Bank (2014),
Zhu and Prosterman (2007) and Tao and Xu (2007), among others.
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cial custom of requiring a son to inherit the land from his father and remain in
agriculture can account for the delay in Japan’s catch-up with the United States.
Beegle, De Weerdt and Dercon (2011) propose home community networks as exit
barriers preventing migration in Tanzania and Munshi and Rosenzweig (2016) in-
vestigate the role of rural caste insurance and social networks as barriers in rural
India. For China, Brandt, Hsieh and Zhu (2008) and Cao and Birchenall (2013)
discuss the implications of the hukou system for the existence of a labour market
wedge, whereas Tombe and Zhu (2017) model the overall economic impact of trade
liberalization and the labour wedge, due partly to assumed land communes. Land
policy as a mobility barrier also plays a role in Adamopoulos et al. (2017), who
focus on workers’selection effects in a heterogeneous labour model as the expla-
nation for China’s sectoral productivity differences. None of these papers models
explicitly both land policy in the context of an ineffi cient rental market and social
subsidies in the context of a sectoral model, which is our main contribution in this
paper.6
Section 2 outlines the household registration system and describes its history
and impacts, paying particular attention to land policy and the role of social
subsidies. Section 3 develops the two-sector model that is used to study the role of
the land policy in the agricultural - non-agricultural labour allocation. In section
4 the model is extended to social subsidies and to three sectors, agricultural and
rural and urban non-agricultural. In section 5 we derive the effi cient allocation
and quantify the likely distortions caused by the hukou restrictions, both in the
context of an otherwise effi cient equilibrium and in the context of a second-best
world characterized by an exogenous labour market wedge.
2 China’s mobility barriers
2.1 The hukou system of registration and its impact
The hukou, or household registration system, assigns a hukou certificate to each
citizen of the People’s Republic and on that basis the person becomes eligible
for some state benefits, in the form of either use of land or social transfers and
services. The system was institutionalized in 1958, when each local area in the
country (a city or a region, depending on population size) issued a hukou to every
6Au and Henderson (2006) also use a three-sector model (agriculture, township and village
non-agriculture and city non-agriculture) which broadly corresponds to our three-sector model.
They employ the techniques of new economic geography to show that both city size and the
township and village enterprise sectors are too small, which is indication of the existence of
mobility barriers out of agriculture. Our results show that the big distortion is in the too small
urban sector, whereas the non-agricultural rural sector is less distorted because of offsetting
impacts of the two policies that we model.
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resident, which classified the resident as either an agricultural worker or a non-
agricultural worker. This became a kind of “passport” for internal use, which
indicates the region of origin of the person and entitles the holder to claim certain
state benefits in their origin region. The objective of the policy was to promote
a Communist ideology connected to the use of land (which belonged entirely to
the state) and the provision of social services. Agricultural workers were given
land to cultivate and were given access to some social services provided by their
rural location (usually social communes), whereas urban workers were expected
to work in factory or offi ce jobs and had access to social benefits, many of them
job-related, which included subsidized medical care, education for their children
and social assistance, funded by the city that issued their hukou.
Initially the hukou registration system was strictly enforced and practically
eliminated all possibilities for industrial or geographical labour mobility. As a
result, before 1980, practically all people living in an area had a local hukou and
all workers working in industry or services had a non-agricultural hukou (Li, Gu
and Zhang, 2015).7
Naturally, this situation was not compatible with a market economy with in-
dustrializing ambitions, as China became after Deng’s reforms. Agriculture was
too big to be productive and industrialization needed labour. In response to this
need, the hukou system was gradually softened and reformed, eventually (by the
late 1990s) allowing free migration across jobs and areas, albeit with registration
never abolished and rarely allowed to change during one’s lifetime. There have
been too many reforms of varying degrees to enable a manageable narrative or the
description of a system that currently applies to everyone. To make things worse,
the strictness with which the system is now applied and the ease with which one
could change one’s registration is left to local authorities, and different local au-
thorities apply different rules. The more prosperous large cities (especially the big
three, Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou) generally follow stricter policies than
towns or smaller cities.8
For modelling purposes, however, we can cut through this complex situation
by focusing on the following four types of agents: agricultural hukou holders work-
ing in one of three locations, agriculture in their rural area of registration, non-
7Up to 1998, offspring inherited their mothers’hukou status and changes were not allowed.
In 1998 the law was changed and children were permitted to inherit either parent’s hukou status,
so there was a little more flexibility, but permissions to change status from that of either parent
were still very rare.
8See Fan (2008), Meng (2014), Chan (2009) and Chan and Buckingham (2008). As an ex-
ample of how standards vary, whereas many smaller provinces encourage migration to achieve
more industrial growth, Shandong province, one of the most industrialized in China, recently
required registration of migrants with the police and fines employers who do not report how
many migrant workers they employ (reported in the Financial Times, December 8, 2016;
https://www.ft.com/content/7c55b30c-bd14-11e6-8b45-b8b81dd5d080)
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agriculture in their rural area of registration and non-agriculture in an urban lo-
cation (the migrants); and non-agricultural hukou holders working in their urban
area of registration. Most of the migration literature ignores the non-agricultural
workers in rural areas, who hold an agricultural hukou. We bring it into the analy-
sis in our full model of section 4 because in the early years of industrialization the
authorities encouraged the growth of "township and village enterprises" which em-
ployed mainly unskilled workers producing labour-intensive goods. Although this
form of employment is now given less emphasis, non-agricultural rural employment
remains a substantial fraction of employment (see again Figure 1). Omitting it
altogether from the analysis misses an important aspect of the industrialization
process in China and an important element of China’s social assistance policies.
We ignore two other types of hukou, the non-agricultural hukou issued in rural
areas and the agricultural hukou issued in urban areas. In rural areas virtually all
residents were originally registered as agricultural workers, except for a small num-
bers of government employees who carried non-agricultural hukou (Chan, 2012,
Table 3). The agricultural hukou issued in urban areas can be ignored because
with increased industrialization and urbanization beginning in the 1990s, agricul-
ture has become too small in urban areas to matter.9
With regard to social services, the condition that only local hukou holders
qualify for them was embedded in the original design of the hukou system and
it still pervades today. Agricultural hukou holders get access to social services
in their rural locality but not to social services in the urban locality after they
move. Because of this, many rural migrants leave their families behind when they
migrate to the city; women may go back to their village when they have a child,
to take advantage of available social services; and many men return to their rural
locations after a few years in the city, especially if they have children of school age
and they want to take advantage of free education in their origin state.
These movements undoubtedly cause social problems for families but the eco-
nomic cost is less important. Formally taking into account return migration due to
changing family circumstances would complicate our model and we do not pursue
it.10 The feature of the system that we emphasize is the ambiguous security of
tenure and the possible loss of access to land once the farmer leaves agricultural
employment, an issue that we describe in more detail in the next subsection. With
9Another reason for ignoring the issuing of different types of hukou by the same authorities is
that many provinces gave up on distinguishing between agricultural and non-agricultural hukou,
beginning around the turn of the millennium. (Chan, 2012, p. 73, Fan, 2008, p.69). Rural areas
issue agricultural hukou and urban areas non-agricultural ones.
10We also do not pursue the modelling of changing hukou type, which some localities offer
after a certain period of work in their area and subject to the qualifications of the worker. Such
changes were rare until recently, although more recently the granting of urban hukou became
more common, especially in smaller cities (Chan, 2009).
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regard to social services we assume that all urban hukou holders have access to
urban social benefits, and all agricultural workers have access to both land and
social services provided by their rural authorities. Migrants (agricultural hukou
holders in urban areas) have no access to any services but non-agricultural workers
in rural areas have access to rural social benefits. More details of these allocations
are given in the sections that follow.
2.2 China’s land policies
Agricultural land is distributed among the rural population on the basis of family
size and other needs, in an attempt to achieve more equality in the village. The
property rights do not pass on to the villager but he and his family can cultivate the
land and the income is all theirs. Two issues are particularly important to farmers
(see Kung, 1995; Mullan, Grosjean and Kontoleon, 2011): security of tenure and
the possibility of renting out the land to other farmers for an income.
Rural land is managed under the Household Responsibility System, originally
enacted in 1978. When the system was first set up no renting of land was allowed
and although land was allocated for 15-year periods, periodically the village leader
would reallocate land on the basis of household changes, which included more
involvement in non-farm work (Kung and Liu, 1997). It was also possible that
agricultural land was taken over by the government for infrastructure projects
(e.g., road building) or construction. So there was no security of tenure and it
was not possible to take advantage of the land to earn an income, other than self-
production. Relaxation of the law with respect to land rentals started early but
village leaders retained some reallocation discretion which, as we elaborate later
in this section, did not help remove the reallocation risk faced by farmers.
With respect to appropriations by the government for infrastructure or urban
development, we make the reasonable assumption that the affected farmers are
given access to new land if they remain in the village and wish to continue in
agricultural production. Although this risk may be important with respect to
issues such as long-term investments in land, it does not play a role in our analysis.
The more important issue for our analysis is the existence of a rental market and
the reallocation risk when a farmer migrates, in view of the absence of property
rights. In particular, whether the migrant farmer can keep his land and rent it out
for an income or whether migrants lose their allocated land when they migrate.11
A reform to the 1978 Household Responsibility System came in 1984, when
11Tao and Xu (2007) argue that farmers worry about land acquisitions because their com-
pensation from the local authorities, whatever its form, is not up to the level of the yield from
their previously allocated land. We do not address this issue but focus on the other two (and
more important) issues that they raise, land reallocations and the migrants’accessibility to social
benefits.
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central document no. 1 allowed rentals subject to permission by the village leader
(Lin, 1989). This right, however, was rarely used, at least in the beginning. Survey
evidence in 1995 reveals that only about 3% of agricultural land was rented out
despite the fact that the agriculture employment share fell from 62% to 48% during
the 1984-1995 period (Brandt et al., 2002). The low rental rate is associated with
the perceived “use it or lose it”rule: renting out land could lead the village leader
to believe that the land was no longer needed by the farmer so it was taken away
and given to someone else in the village in the next reallocation (Yang, 1997;
Brandt, Rozelle and Turner, 2004; Adamopoulos et al., 2017).
A second major reform came in 1998 with the Land Management Law, which
introduced some formal documentation for the land tenure right. Although the
Act did not have the full intended effect, the rental market did show some growth,
with about 10% of farmers renting out their land by 2000, with large variations
across regions (Deininger and Jin, 2005; Wang, Riedinger and Jin, 2015).
A more important development in land law came in 2003, with the passing
of the Rural Land Contracting Law, which was designed to strengthen tenure
rights. It offered more secure tenure by limiting reallocations and permitting
transfer of lands between households (see Li, 2003, Jin and Deininger, 2009 and
Wang, Riedinger and Jin, 2015). This reform, combined with increased rural-
urban migration, led to a further growth in the rental market, with 19% of farmers
renting out their land by 2008 (see the survey by Wang, Riedinger and Jin, 2015).
Reallocations, however, were frequent before the passing of the law (Brandt et al.,
2002) and continued after 2003, albeit at a lower rate (Deininger and Jin, 2009;
Deininger et al., 2014; Liao et al., 2016). In a five-wave survey taken in 1999-
2010 and covering 17 provinces that accounted for 77% of the rural population,
Feng, Bao and Jiang (2014) report that after the first round of land contracting
in 1984, 80% of villages experienced reallocation by 1999 and 82% by 2001. After
the second-round of contracting beginning in 1993, 40% of villages experienced
reallocation by 2010. These numbers are consistent with other evidence. For
example, Wang, Riedinger and Jin (2015) in their survey of six provinces report
that the percentage of villages experiencing some kind of reallocation in the five-
year period prior to the year in question, declined from 66% in 2000 to 16% in
2008. The former figure is consistent with the evidence of Brandt et al. (2002) in
their survey of 215 villages across eight provinces (72% reallocations in 1983-1995).
The decline of reallocation incidence, however, did not necessarily lead to the
emergence of an effi cient rental market. The evidence of Wang, Riedinger and Jin
(2015) shows that about half of land transfers were still to relatives throughout the
period 2000-08, most rental agreements were verbal and not very well specified and
rent was paid in only 31% of transfers in 2000 and in 41% in 2008, on average at a
lower rate in 2008 than in 2000. Moreover, in a 2011 pilot survey of Shaanxi and
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Jiangsu provinces, Brandt et al. (2017) show that in nearly half of the transfers
arranged by the village, payments to households were in arrears. With the absence
of written contracts in most cases, households renting out their land did not have
much say over the matter.12 Consistent with this, the World Bank (2014, chapter
4) reported that land transfers were taking place at low rental rates, they were
unrecorded, and they were subject to a lot of uncertainties which reduced the real
value of the land to farmers.
In the formal modelling that follows we deal with the complex issue of land
transfers by allowing for an imperfect rental market that functions between two
extremes, the “use it or lose it” extreme whereby if a farmer does not cultivate
his land it is taken away by the village leader and is reallocated to other farmers,
and the “guaranteed tenure”extreme according to which the farmer is guaranteed
a tenure on the land and he can deal with it as he likes during the period of the
guarantee.13 On the basis of the discussion of this section we consider the former
to be a much closer description of the situation in China at least up to the passing
of the 1998 and 2003 Acts, whereas the latter corresponds to a policy reform
that involves either the privatization of land or equivalently the granting of full
security of tenure, something not yet implemented.14 Besides the two extremes we
model the intermediate case where a land rental market exists but rents are below
competitive market rates. This is evidenced by the fact that the vast majority
of transfers (up to 90%) are still to relatives or villagers known to the farmer, in
the majority of cases with no rent payments (but presumably with some payment
in kind in the form of product gifts) and the majority rely on oral contracts. As
the World Bank reports, such contractual arrangements lead on average to rents
or payments in kind that are below competitive rates, with migrating farmers
compromising for such low rates in the absence of formal tenure certificates and
to avoid stimulating the attention of the village authorities which can still exercise
12Wang, Riedinger and Jin (2015) report that about half of respondents in their survey had
full certification of their land tenure, as enacted in the 2003 law, whereas Prosterman et al.
(2011) in their survey of seventeen provinces claim that the fraction of farmers who had properly
enforceable contracts was closer to a quarter.
13We say “he” because there is some uncertainty about women’s right to the land. See
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2017-11/04/content_34098958.htm
14In light of the remaining uncertainties about reallocations, Liao et al. (2016) and Tombe
and Zhu (2017) adopt the former simplification (whereby the farmer loses the land when he
migrates) in their modelling of migration and the same extreme case was modelled in an earlier
version of our paper that circulated as CEPR Discussion Paper no.11657 (24 November 2016).
Law changes are still taking place with a view to strengthening tenure guarantees. In April 2017
China Daily reported a proposed law designed to make migrants “feel more secure holding the
land contracts,”and drawing a distinction between the owner of the land, which is the state, the
contractor, who is the local resident allocated the land, and the manager, who is cultivating it.
See http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2017-11/04/content_34098958.htm
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an arbitrary reallocation in favour of farmers who remain in the village. One of
the contributions of our paper is to show how the reallocation risk leads to an
equilibrium rent that is below the competitive rate, as postulated by the World
Bank and others.
3 China’s land policy in a model of migration
The state makes available at zero rent land plots to local agricultural hukou hold-
ers. The land remains the property of the state but the agricultural hukou holder
can “manage” the land, namely cultivate it for a return. If he is unable or un-
willing to cultivate the land he may be able to rent it out for some return or lose
it altogether to an administrative reallocation. We assume the absence of real
or financial assets, so we can work with a one-period model. Land is allocated
from the state on a per-period basis for cultivation and cannot be used to make
intertemporal transfers (e.g., through mortgages). All output is consumed in the
period that is produced and consumers are price-takers.
In order to focus the analysis on labour distortions we assume that goods
markets are frictionless and all consumers face the same prices. For this to hold
all goods must be transferable without cost across space, an assumption that we
make. The distortions introduced by the hukou type alter only the incomes re-
ceived by different groups of workers. We further assume that there are only two
regions, a rural one that produces agricultural goods and an urban one that pro-
duces non-agricultural goods. We ignore the non-agricultural production in rural
areas in this section. We denote all rural/agricultural production by subscript a
and all urban/non-agricultural production by subscript u.With these assumptions
urbanization and industrialization are one and the same.15
3.1 Consumer allocations and production functions
The utility function of an agent i is defined by








where ω ∈ [0, 1] and c̄a is a subsistence level for agricultural goods (which delivers
a lower and more realistic income elasticity for agricultural goods than for non-
agricultural ones), ci is the consumption aggregate for each person and cia and
15Strictly speaking, our analysis in this section is about the allocation of labour between
agricultural production and all other activities. We refer to the latter as urban for notational
and linguistic simplicity.
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ciu respectively denote consumption of the agricultural and the non-agricultural
goods. Throughout the paper we use superscript i for individual and subscript j
for types of goods. Individuals can be of different types due to the hukou they
hold or the sector in which they are employed.





u ≤ I i. (2)
where pa is the price of the agricultural good, pu the price of the non-agricultural
good and I i is the income of individual i.
Maximization of the utility function subject to the budget constraint gives the









The value-added production function for the non-agricultural good is,
yu = Aunu (4)
where yu denotes output, nu is the fraction of the labour force employed in non-
agriculture and Au is a technology parameter. With linear production function
and competitive equilibrium all revenue is passed on to labour, so wages are:
wu = puAu. (5)
Given the important role of land in our analysis, the agricultural production
function has to take it into account explicitly, noting that all agricultural land
is offi cially owned by the state. We let ha be the measure of agricultural hukou
holders (and hu = 1 − ha the measure of urban hukou holders), na the fraction
of employment in agriculture, with na ≤ ha to reflect the direction of migration
movements, and l be the total area of land made available for agricultural use (a
policy constant). Let lia be the land cultivated by a single farmer i. The farmer’s





0 ≤ β < 1, (6)
where Aa is agricultural technology.
The village leader allocates a plot of size l/ha to every local hukou holder.
Those who stay on the land cultivate their allocation plus any land that they rent
from the migrants. In light of our discussion in section 2.2, we assume that the
rental market is subject to the uncertainties of reallocation. Of course, there could
be other reasons for market failures but we believe that the reallocation risk is the
main one in China.
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Consider the following sequence of events within the single period. They take
place simultaneously but the motivation is clearer if we describe them as a sequence
of actions. The village leader moves first to allocate l/ha land to all local hukou
holders. Next the hukou holders decide whether to stay and cultivate the land or
migrate; a measure na ≤ ha stay. Next a rental market opens for migrants’land.
Let the rental that clears the market be ρ. A remaining (non-migrating) farmer
i rents φi units of land and pays the rent ρφi. Migrants take the rents and leave
the area. Before production begins, the village leader makes a move. He decides
whether to enter the market for a second allocation round or stay away and allow
the farmers to cultivate the land that they rented. The village leader’s action is
uncertain ex ante; farmers attach a probability λ to non-reallocation. Under a
guaranteed tenure regime λ = 1; the village leader takes no further action and
production begins on the rented land. If tenure is not guaranteed he might take
the land of the migrant and reallocate it for free. Under a use it or lose it regime
λ = 0; the village leader reallocates the land of the migrants with probability 1.
Once reallocations take place production begins. In intermediate cases λ ∈ (0, 1);
there is a probability (1−λ) between 0 and 1 that the village leader will reallocate.
Under this arrangement farmer i with probability λ gets to cultivate his initial
allocation l/ha plus the land he rented, φ
i; with probability 1−λ he loses the land
that he rented in a reallocation but being resident in the village he is reallocated
a share of the land that the village leader expropriated. In an egalitarian regime,
in the second-round allocation each farmer receives an equal share of the land left
behind by migrants which, when added to the initial egalitarian allocation, results
in a land plot of size l/na for each remaining farmer. Formally, when farmer i
enters the rental market the land that he will be able to cultivate satisfies,
lia =
l/ha + φ
i with probability λ
l/na with probability 1− λ
(7)






+ (1− λ)paAa (l/na)1−β − ρφi. (8)







Since all farmers are identical they all choose the same φ, which under market
clearing must be equal to l/na − l/ha. Therefore lia = l/na; the farmer gets to
16Note that condition (9) and all subsequent ones hold even if the farmer maximized expected
utility instead of expected income because it applies to only one state of nature, the one of no
reallocation.
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cultivate the same plot of land in both states of nature and the equilibrium rental
is,
ρ = λ(1− β)paAa(l/na)−β = λr, (10)
where r denotes the marginal product of land. We have established:
Proposition 1 An ex ante reallocation probability (1 − λ) of land that is not
cultivated by contracted farmers implies a rental market for land that clears at
rent λr, where λ ∈ [0, 1] and r is the marginal product of land in agriculture.
The reallocation probability (1− λ) introduces a discount on rents that plays
the role of a risk premium borne by migrating farmers. In a risk-free market (the
guaranteed tenure one) they collect rents r for their land. But because in reality
they run the risk of reallocation, the market clears at a lower rent λr, so (1− λ)r
is a discount on their rent due to the reallocation risk. Ex-post, remaining farmers
do not face any risks because they cultivate the same land plot l/na whatever
happens, so the entire cost of the reallocation risk is borne by the migrants.
Under these conditions, the farmers’net return is the value of output of his
farm, payia, less the cost of the rents ρφ
i = λr(l/na − l/ha), which is,
Ia = [1− λ(1− β)] paAa (l/na)1−β + λrl/ha. (11)
Note that in the guaranteed tenure case of λ = 1, the first part on the right side
of (11) is labour’s return from the farm (the marginal product of labour) and the
second term the (competitive) rent from the land gifted by the state to agricultural
hukou holders. In the more relevant range of λ < 1, the labour component is higher
and the rent component lower. In the reallocation extreme of “use it or lose” it
λ = 0, and the farmer’s income is the entire output of the farm (the average
product of labour).
Aggregate food production is given by the summation of yia over i, i.e. nay
i
a,
which in view of the symmetric solution lia = l/na, becomes the output of a con-






3.2 Worker’s migration decision
The migration condition equates wages in the urban location plus any rents that
the migrant can collect from the initial land allocation, to the net return from
cultivation had the migrant remained in agricultural production. The income of
the agricultural worker is given by Ia in (11) and the income of the migrant by
Im, defined by:
Im = puAu + λrl/ha, (13)
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which is the sum of the wage from non-agricultural production wu, obtained in
(5), and the rental income on the initial land allocation, λrl/ha. The migration
condition equates the two income levels, Ia = Im and can now be stated:
[1− λ(1− β)] paAa (l/na)1−β = puAu. (14)
In the case λ = 1, where there is a risk-free secondary market for land rentals,
the migration condition (14) equates the value of marginal product of labour in
each sector, despite the initial rent-free allocation by the state. But if λ < 1, the
migrating farmer gets less than marginal revenue product from his land when he
leaves, and pays below-market rates for a portion of his land if he stays, and so
migration is lower.






; π ≡ β
1− λ(1− β) ≤ 1 (15)
Migration equates the value of marginal product of labour in agriculture to a
fraction π < 1 of that in the non-agricultural sector, a typical feature of the
misallocation of resources. The term π can be interpreted as a form of “labour
market wedge”, which has the same impact as an income loss by rural migrants in
the non-agricultural destination, compared with local hukou holders who receive
the full wage puAu. This wedge is an endogenous outcome of the model due to the
land policy. In the extreme case when λ = 0, i.e. those who leave the farm receive
no rental income, the model implies that the endogenous wedge is equal to β, i.e.
the implicit income loss is equal to the share of land (1− β) in the production
function. The estimates of factor shares in China imply a β of about 0.5 (see Cao
and Birchenall, 2013, Fuglie and Rada, 2015), giving a substantial endogenous
implicit income loss in the new state of about 50%.
The migration condition (14) depends on the endogenous relative price of the
two goods which needs to be solved out in a general equilibrium but its properties
and sources of ineffi ciency (when compared to a perfect rental market) can be
illustrated in a simple diagram, as follows (see figure 2). The vertical axis measures
the returns from labour in each sector (for given relative prices) and the horizontal
measures agricultural employment from left to right (and since nu = 1− na, non-
agricultural employment from right to left, with 1 as origin). Because of the
linear production function, the returns from urban employment are independent of
employment, as in the right side of (14), and shown by the horizontal line at puAu.
The returns from rural employment slope down in employment left to right because
of diminishing returns. The probability λ is a shift variable in this relationship.
For λ = 1 the curve takes its lowest position and λ = 0 gives the highest position.
The equilibrium for a perfect rental market is given by the intersection at n∗a. For
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an imperfect market with rents below the marginal product of land, equilibrium
is at an intersection between n∗a and n
0
a, the latter denoting the intersection in the
“use it or lose it”extreme (λ = 0). Clearly, a λ < 1 yields too much employment
in agriculture, because farmers do not take into account the full cost of the land
in their decisions; they behave as if the cost of land is λr instead of r.
3.3 Market clearing conditions
The migration results shown in figure 2 are partial but deriving the equilibrium
ones by solving out for prices does not alter the intuition or properties that they
illustrate. We solve for prices by equating demand and supply for the aggregate
economy, consisting of three types of consumers: the hu urban (non-agricultural)
hukou holders who work in the urban sector, the na rural (agricultural) hukou
holders who work in agriculture and the m = (ha − na) migrants who work in
the urban economy and hold agricultural hukou. Let cuj and c
i
j, i = a,m be
the corresponding consumption levels for the three types of agents. The market
clearing condition for non-agricultural goods is:
Au (1− na) = hucuu + nacau + (ha − na) cmu (16)






a + (ha − na) cma . (17)
Definition 2 The land policy equilibrium is defined by the rental market in Propo-
sition 1, policy parameters (ha, hu, λ) and a sequence of prices {pa, pu}, consump-
tion allocations {cia, ciu}i=a,m,u and labour allocations {na, 1− na} such that: given
prices, the consumption allocations maximize the utility functions subject to the
respective budget constraint; the employment allocation satisfies the migration con-
dition that equates labour income in the two sectors; and prices satisfy the market
clearing conditions.
With this definition we establish,
Proposition 3 If land is an essential input into production, β < 1, a land pol-
icy that keeps rents below the value of marginal product of land is a non-trivial
barrier to labour mobility, inducing a bigger labour allocation in agriculture and
less in non-agricultural production. These allocations coexist with a lower relative
productivity in agriculture.
The proof is straightforward and we sketch it here. Aggregating the MRS
condition (3) with the weight of each type of consumer and making use of the
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market clearing conditions (16) and (17) yields,
Aal







Au (1− na) . (18)
Substituting the relative prices pu/pa from (14) and making use of (4), yields














where π is the “wedge”measure in (15), π = β/[1−λ (1− β)] ∈ [β, 1].We note that
the wedge is due entirely to the land policy and if π = 1 it is zero, so the implicit
income loss from migration, compared to the effi cient rental market is (1−π). The
highest value of π = 1 corresponding to the perfect rental market case of λ = 1,
and the lowest value of π = β, corresponds to the “use it of lose it”case of λ = 0.
The former yields a migration condition that equates the marginal product of
labour across sectors, whereas the lowest value π = β equates the average product
of labour in agriculture to the marginal product in urban production (which is
equal to the average product but only because of the linearity of the production
function).
The results stated in Proposition 3 follow from equation (19). First, we note
that the left side slopes down in na and the right side slopes up, giving a unique so-
lution for agricultural employment. Second, the left-side ratio is the ratio of urban
to rural employment, which depends positively on λ, through its impact on the
wedge π. This establishes the main property of the labour allocation highlighted
in the Proposition. The guaranteed tenure regime with λ = 1 delivers the highest
urban to rural employment ratio whereas the “use it or lose it”alternative gives
the lowest. The intuition is the same as the one that we gave in the preceding
section about migration; the more distant the rental market from its effi cient level,
the bigger the wedge between rural and urban labour returns. Other properties
of the labour allocation are equally intuitive. The ratio of urban to rural employ-
ment depends positively on the relative preference for non-agricultural goods, on
the flexibility in agricultural consumption as measured by the discretionary (non-
subsistence) component of consumption, and negatively on the income share of
labour in agriculture. Finally, labour productivity in agriculture is below that in
non-agriculture. As (15) shows, the marginal product of labour in agriculture is
a fraction π of the marginal product in non-agriculture, and yet workers do not
reallocate from rural to urban areas. By extension, this misallocation of labour
contributes to a lower aggregate productivity in the economy as a whole.
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4 Government subsidies
We now introduce the second main policy tool associated with the hukou system
—government subsidies. The local authorities in all areas of the country subsi-
dize part of the consumption of local hukou holders by supplying free of charge
some locally-produced social services, such as education and health. They do not
subsidize the consumption of migrant workers, who are commonly referred to as
“floating workers”. The subsidies are financed through local taxation and the im-
plication that we emphasize here is that migrants have to pay taxes but receive no
benefits, a feature of the system that acts as a migration disincentive.
As we pointed out in section 2, the system was originally introduced to prohibit
migration. In the first stages of reform, beginning in 1978, the Chinese authorities
relaxed some of the migration restrictions but rather than encouraging migration
to the cities from the start, they encouraged the formation of small “township and
village enterprises”, so agricultural workers could move to industrial jobs within
their area of registration. The aim of the policy was partly in line with the more
general political objective of gradual relaxation of the restrictions of the Mao era,
and partly to preserve the access of local residents to subsidized services. Figure
1 shows a bulge in rural non-agricultural employment in the 1980s, an indication
that the policy was successful. Later the hukou restrictions were relaxed further,
leading to growth in industrial employment in urban areas, but the rural non-
agricultural sector remained an important source of non-agricultural employment
in predominantly agricultural areas.
We take this fact into account by generalizing the model of the preceding
section by introducing a second non-agricultural sector, located in the rural area.
The good produced in the urban areas is still distinguished by subscript u and the
non-agricultural good produced in rural areas by subscript r. Workers who move
out of agriculture are modelled as in the preceding section but their access to social
subsidies depends on their destination: if they move to the rural non-agricultural
sector they retain their local subsidies but if they move to the urban area they
lose them and they are not entitled to draw urban subsidies.17 Our distinction
between rural and urban non-agricultural jobs enables us to discuss separately
the processes of industrialization and urbanization, which have been a feature of
Chinese economic development since the reforms of the 1980s.
To proceed, we assume that the authorities buy a fraction sj (j = r, u) of local
17We maintain the same assumptions about land as in the preceding section for all workers
who move out of agriculture. There is some evidence in the literature that workers who move
to the rural non-agricultural sector, especially if they are located within commuting distance of
their village, have a better chance of retaining access to their land than workers who move to
urban areas. Modelling this case requires a model of family allocations or of dual jobs and we
do not pursue it in this paper.
18
non-agricultural output and give it to local hukou holders for free and raise lump
sum taxes Tj (j = r, u) to finance them locally. To avoid pathological situations
where consumers might want to sell government services we assume that sj is
suffi ciently small so that sjyj < cij in all equilibria. The policy parameters with
government subsidies are (ha, hu, sr, su) , which are taken as given, and where, as
before, ha is the fraction of the population with agricultural hukou and hu = 1−ha
is the fraction with non-agricultural hukou.
We define the following equilibrium allocation with government policy.
Definition 4 The full-policy equilibrium is defined by the rental market in Propo-
sition 1, policy parameters (ha, hu, sr, su, λ), lump sum taxes (Tr, Tu) and prices
{pr, pu, pa} , consumption allocations {cia, cir, ciu}i=a,r,u,m and labour allocations (na, nr, nu)
such that: given prices, the consumption allocations maximize utility functions
subject to their respective budget constraints; the labour allocations satisfy the
migration conditions that set incomes in all sectors equal to each other. Prices
{pr, pu, pa} satisfy market clearing conditions and equilibrium lump-sum taxes sat-
isfy government budget constraints separately in each region.
The rest of this section is devoted to characterizing this equilibrium.
4.1 Consumer’s and worker’s allocations
The utility function is the same as (1) except that now there is a second non-
agricultural good cr :













with ω, ψ ∈ (0, 1) and η is the elasticity of substitution between rural and ur-
ban non-agricultural good. The production functions for the two types of non-
agricultural goods are:18
yj = Ajnj; i = r, u. (21)
With government subsidies and taxes, consumer’s budget constraints are af-
fected differently across different types of consumers. In rural areas, there are
18We retain the linear structure of production for simplicity and for direct comparison with
the model of the preceding sections, and differentiate between the two non-agricultural goods in
the utility function. An alternative with similar results would be to differentiate the two goods in
production, treating them as intermediary goods aggregating up to the final consumption good.
Qualitative results would be identical.
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agricultural and non-agricultural workers. Given that they are all rural hukou





r − sryr) + puciu = I i − Tr, i = a, r (22)
where Ia is the same as in the land policy equilibrium (11) and
Ir = prAr + λrl/ha, (23)
which is similar to (13).
In urban areas there are migrant workers who are not entitled to government
subsidies but pay local taxes.19 The budget constraint for these workers is different








m − Tu, (24)








u − suyu) = Iu − Tu. (25)
The income of urban hukou holders is simply the wage income in (5).
The consumer utility maximization is similar to before except that there is
an optimal consumption choice across rural and urban non-agricultural goods.





























Since rural workers do not lose their right to social subsidies if they remain in
the rural areas, the mobility condition across agriculture and the non-agricultural
19Pan and Wei (2013) write, “Unfortunately, children of migrant workers in China are deprived
of the right to compulsory education despite the fact that these workers pay taxes in their host
cities and their employers pay the so-called “city construction fees”and “educational surcharge””.
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sector in rural areas is similar to (14) in the land policy equilibrium without
subsidies, as illustrated in figure 2:
[1− λ (1− β)] paAa (l/na)1−β = prAr. (28)
Using budget constraints (22) and (24), the migration condition for an agricul-
tural worker moving to an urban location is:
[1− λ (1− β)] paAa (l/na)1−β + prsryr − Tr = puAu − Tu (29)
Turning now to government, budget balance in rural locations requires,
prsryr = Tr, (30)
because all rural residents are also rural hukou holders. In urban locations the
recipients of subsidies are the hu urban hukou holders whereas the tax payers are
the same hu workers plus the m migrants with agricultural hukou:
hupusuyu = (hu +m)Tu. (31)
Substitution of the government’s financing constraints and the urban production
function into the migration condition (29), in view of the employment share in
urban production being, as before, nu = hu+m, simplifies the migration condition
between agriculture and urban production to:
[1− λ (1− β)] paAa (l/na)1−β = puAu (1− husu) . (32)
Comparison with (14) makes clear the role of government subsidies in migration
decisions. They act as a disincentive to urban migration because of the tax that
migrants have to pay without matching social subsidies, reducing the net income
that migrants receive after migration. In figure 2, the impact of subsidies is to shift
down the horizontal line for the labour return in the urban location, the shift factor
being (1− husu). The downward shift moves the intersection point further to the
right, away from the effi cient point n∗a, so the intersection between the downward
sloping line with the relevant λ and the new urban line can now be to the right of
the “use it or lose it”intersection n0a.
The migration conditions (28) and (32) can also be re-written to mirror (15):
βpaAa (l/na)
1−β = πprAr = πσpuAu, (33)
with the same definition for π and where we defined a new wedge related to urban
subsidies as σ ≡ (1− husu) ; the shift factor in figure 2. Like π, σ attains its
maximum value when there is no distortion, in which case su = 0 and σ = 1.
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Given the restriction su < 1, and by definition hu < 1, σ has a strictly positive
minimum, reached in the limit as su rises.
The presence of σ < 1 on the right-hand side of (33) is an additional source of
implicit income loss in the urban state relative to the land-policy equilibrium in
equation (15). It generates a larger labour market wedge, so social subsidies act as
an additional type of barrier against the movement from rural to urban locations.
The interaction of the two policies generates a rather complex picture of migra-
tion barriers. Agricultural workers’main barrier is the land, because they could
go to a non-agricultural job in their locality without affecting the taxes and social
subsidies they face; this makes land policy the main barrier to industrialization.
Rural non-agricultural workers can migrate to urban areas but they then have to
pay taxes without receiving subsidized services; the urban tax and subsidy policy
is mainly a barrier to urbanization. Of course, in equilibrium both policies affect
both industrialization and urbanization. These results are derived more formally
in the next section, which endogenizes relative prices.
4.3 Employment allocations under the full hukou system
As in the case of the two-sector model, solving for prices does not alter the key
intuition and qualitative results discussed in the preceding section. These results
are summarized in the following Proposition:
Proposition 5 Social subsidies given to urban hukou holders and the land reallo-
cation risk when land is rented reduce both the urbanization and industrialization
rates; subsidies work by introducing disincentives to urbanization whereas the land
policy works by introducing disincentives to industrialization.
Appendix 7.1 derives the equilibrium employment shares step by step. The








































Equations (34) replace the single equation nu = 1 − na of the two-sector model
and equation (36) replaces the important equation (19) of the two-sector model.
Note that for σ = 1 (no subsidies), (36) collapses to (19).
Prices are given by the equality of demand and supply for each good, noting
that there are now four types of consumers instead of the previous three: the hu
urban hukou holders who work in the urban sector, the agricultural hukou holders
who work in agriculture, na, and non-agriculture, nr, and the m migrants in the
urban sector. Refer to the Appendix for more details.
That subsidies work mainly against urbanization in the equilibrium allocation
follows immediately from (34): Higher subsidy rate lowers σ and the ratio of ur-
ban to rural non-agricultural employment, nu/nr. From equation (36), urban social
transfers also lower overall industrialization, by reducing non-agricultural employ-
ment relative to agricultural.20 It follows that urban employment is a smaller frac-
tion of a reduced overall industrialization incidence, whereas rural non-agricultural
employment is a relatively bigger fraction of the reduced industrialization. Urban
subsidies reduce both industrialization and urbanization but their main disincen-
tive is on urbanization. The other properties of the solution for agricultural em-
ployment are the same as in the two-sector model without subsidies.
Social transfers in rural areas, sr, do not play a role in the employment al-
location. The intuition is twofold: first, movements between agricultural and
non-agricultural jobs in rural areas do not affect the social subsidies received and
taxes paid by rural workers, so they do not distort the rural allocation decisions.
Second, once agricultural hukou holders decide to move to urban locations, they
lose the rural benefits but also do not have to pay rural taxes, and these balance
each other out by the assumption of regional budget balance.
5 Policy distortions
5.1 Effi cient allocations
We now lay down the effi cient allocations by solving the planner’s problem. The
social planner chooses labour and land allocations to maximize the utility of the
representative agent as in (20), subject to the production technologies (6) and (21),
20For very high values of η this condition may not hold. When η is very high, rural and urban
non-agricultural goods are virtually identical and when subsidies are raised by a small amount
large numbers of agricultural hukou holders might move back from urban to rural non-agriculture
and agriculture. We exclude this pathological situation by imposing the required restriction on
η, which is η ≤ [1 +Xσ−η] /Xσ−η(1 − σ). Clearly, this is always satisfied for σ = 1 but as σ
takes lower values the upper limit on η is a finite number. In section 5.2 we show that Xσ−η
and σ can be quantified and applying the numbers for 2010 we get, η ≤ 103.
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and the land and labour resource constraints. The planner’s problem is formally
derived in Appendix 7.2 and stated here:
Proposition 6 In the optimal allocation, the value of the marginal product of







= ξ j = a, r, u, (37)
where ξ is the corresponding multiplier for the labour resource constraint. There


























Comparing the effi cient allocation in (39) with that in the hukou equilibrium
in (36) implies that agricultural employment is higher in the hukou equilibrium
given 0 < σ ≤ 1 and 0 < π ≤ 1, both because of the subsidies and the imperfect
rental market for migrant land. The intuition for these results is the same as the
one given in connection to figure 2. The subsidies also raise nr/nu so it follows
from (34) that urban employment is ineffi ciently low in the hukou equilibrium
because of both policies. Non-agricultural rural employment is pushed up above
the effi cient level by the subsidization policy and pushed down by the land policy,
potentially giving an ambiguous result. The results of this section are summarized
in the following proposition:
Proposition 7 The hukou equilibrium with 0 < husu < 1 and 0 < λ < 1 (equiv-
alently, 0 < σ < 1 and 0 < π < 1) implies an ineffi ciently high agricultural em-
ployment share and an ineffi ciently low urban employment share, with ambiguous
results on the rural non-agricultural employment share.
The hukou equilibrium yields the effi cient allocation when there is a risk-free
rental market for agricultural land (λ = 1) and either no subsidies or (because of
our non-distortionary modelling of both transfers and taxes) universal subsidiza-
tion covering migrants as well. This holds independently of the specific ownership
structure for land; the important property required is that farmers have guaranteed
tenure during the period of their contract.
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Proposition 8 The decentralized equilibrium is effi cient if there is guaranteed
tenure with a perfect rental market for land (λ = 1) and there are either no re-
gion specific urban subsidies (su = 0) or no exclusion of migrants from the urban
subsidies.
Dividing (36) by (39), we can compare more explicitly the agricultural employ-












where the agricultural production function Aanβa l









A higher labour wedge (lower π) increases the ineffi ciency in the labour alloca-
tion as it acts as a policy-induced disincentive to migration. A similar argument
applies for lower σ, the subsidy wedge. From the definition of π we find that for
λ < 1, π increases in β, so a higher labour share in agriculture reduces the wedge
and the distortion caused by the imperfect rental market. The intuition follows
from our solution: in the case with perfect rental market, λ = 1, labour gets
a share β of agricultural output whereas in the policy equilibrium it gets share
(1− λ (1− β)) , so the higher is β the closer the two equilibrium outcomes will be.
Another important parameter that influences the gap between the policy out-
come and the effi cient one is the value of subsistence consumption, c̄a. A higher
value for c̄a implies that substitution possibilities between agricultural and non-
agricultural consumption are more limited so removing some of the incentives that
farmers have to migrate does not have as much impact on their decisions as in
cases where consumers are more likely to switch between agricultural and non-
agricultural goods. The ratio in (41) increases in the subsistence ratio c̄a/ya given
the over-employment in agriculture (na > n∗a) that we have already established.
A final property of the policy equilibrium to note is that there are interactions
in the impact of policy on outcomes. Higher subsidies reduce σ and the ratio
(σ +Xσ1−η) / (1 +Xσ1−η), so, if the distortion from land increases and π falls, its
marginal impact is reduced when subsidies are higher. The same applies to the
marginal impact of subsidies; it is maximized in the case of an effi cient land policy.
5.2 Quantitative impacts of policy distortions
We conclude with some measures of the quantitative importance of the sources of
ineffi ciency that we have identified in this paper. These are the land reallocation
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risk and the consequent absence of an unencumbered rental market for land and the
hukou-linked entitlement to social subsidies. We are not doing a full calibration of
the Chinese employment allocation but we are merely looking for ways that enable
us to put an approximate value on the ineffi ciencies caused by the two policies. We
measure ineffi ciency by the deviation of observed employment from the model’s
effi cient allocation. We make use of some parameter estimates in the literature
and statistical information from China.
Our assertion is that the observed employment allocation in the three sectors,
agriculture and rural and urban non—agriculture, corresponds to the one obtained
in the model with both a land and a subsidy policy, which we denoted (na, nr, nu)
and obtained in section 4. We then use (40) to compare the policy equilibrium with
the effi cient allocation and we also study the impact when only the land policy is
in operation, by setting su = 0.
Starting with parameters in (40), we get an estimate of β = 0.51 from the work
of Cao and Birchenall (2013);21 from (34) we obtain Xσ−η = nr/nu using observed
employment allocations; the measure of urban hukou holders hu is given by Chan
(2012); and the subsidy su was computed by us from several Chinese statistical
sources and includes spending on education, health care services, pensions, and
other social assistance programmes (e.g., basic living subsidies). Full details of the
data are reported in Appendix 7.3 and 7.6.
The final parameter required to derive the distortion in industrialization is c̄a.
We treat c̄a as a constant, as is commonly assumed in the development literature,
and start from an initial year in which almost all consumption is at subsistence
level. We take this year to be 1978, before the big migrations started and when
agriculture was still employing 68% of the labour force; we choose c̄a such that
c̄a/ya = 0.9 for that year.22 Given the value of c̄a, equilibrium condition (36)
implies a time series of c̄a/ya. (see Appendix 7.4). Together with (41), we can use
(40) to compute n∗a for any observed agricultural employment share na and a given
value of λ. Finally, to derive the distortion in urbanization, we compute n∗u using
(38) which requires a value for η to separate X from σ−η. We assume that η is
equal to 2. Small variations in this number do not change the results given that
husu is small and so σ ≡ (1− husu) is very close to unity.23
Results depend crucially on the value of λ, as one would expect, since λ = 1
21They estimate for Chinese agriculture a share of capital of 0.25, land 0.37 and labour 0.38,
which implies β = 0.38/0.75 = 0.51. This value is in line with the estimates of Fuglie and Rada
(2015) and Adamopoulos et al. (2017). The small differences in the three estimated values make
only marginal differences to our results.
22Lower subsistence would increase the distortion.
23We note that although η appears in the equation for agricultural employment, (36), a value
is not required to compute n∗a, because by (34) the whole expression Xσ
−η is equal to nr/nu
and we can use data from the employment series to calibrate it.
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yields effi ciency. What is a reasonable value? As explained in section 2.2, before
1984 land was always appropriated and despite the issuing of a new document
in 1984, the same can be assumed up to the passing of the 1998 Act. In this
period λ = 0. Although the 1998 Act improved property rights, the market did
not pick up until after property rights were strengthened in the 2003 Act. For
2004 we use λ = 0.2, based on the Feng, Bao and Jiang (2014) finding that 80% of
villages were experiencing reallocations at this time. From 2004 onwards the rental
market started improving gradually but never reached maturity. Feng, Bao and
Jiang (2014) report that by 2010, 40% of villages were experiencing reallocations,
so we use λ = 0.6 for this year.24
We derive results both for su = 0 and for the full policy model with the
computed value of su, to shed light on the relative importance of each distortionary
policy. Table 1 shows the results for three years, 1998, 2004 and 2010, the first two
being landmark policy-change years and the third the last year of our sample.
The table shows the year and the percentage of urban hukou holders in that
year in column 1, the type of model with values for λ and the computed su in
the next three columns, next a column for “income loss”and finally in the final
three columns the computed results, with the first row of each year showing the
computed effi cient equilibrium employment share and in the other two rows the
percentage-point distortion due to the policy. The column for income loss is the
implicit loss of income to the migrant that we used in our formulas (e.g., equation
(33)), measured as a percentage of the wage rate in urban areas. It is clear from
the results in the table that the land policy causes a much bigger distortion to
implicit incomes than the subsidies, even in the final year when both λ and su
increased due to new legislation that strengthened tenure rights and increased
urban subsidies.25
Our results show that the distortions in the allocation of employment to agricul-
ture and non-agriculture (industrialization) are substantial, especially in the early
years. In 1998 agricultural employment is 8 percentage points higher than in the
effi cient allocation and in 2004 this number remains high, at 7 percentage points.
24We reiterate that these numbers are not meant to be accurate measures of the ex ante reallo-
cation probability but numbers that are reasonable approximations to the observed reallocation
rates in the rural locations of the migrants. Our objective is to use plausible numbers to get
ball-park figures for the policy distortions.
25Two caveats that can be stated with respect to the impact of subsidies are as follows (both
pointed out by anonymous referees). First, our computed subsidy rates are derived from govern-
ment spending but if migrants buy services such as education and health in urban areas at higher
prices than the cost of these to the government (which is very likely), then the disincentive to
migrants from their exclusion from these services is higher than computed. Second, and working
in the opposite direction, migrants may continue using the services provided in their home area,
e.g., by sending their children to school there or going back for health treatment if the need
arises, and this reduces the income loss from migration.
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Social subsidies do not affect these numbers by much. By 2010, when agricultural
employment is almost half of what it was in 2004, the distortion from the land pol-
icy is down to 3.8 percentage points and that of subsidies to 0.2 points. In all these
cases, the land policy distortion is equivalent to about 18-22% over-employment
in agriculture.
The impact of subsidies is relatively more important in the urbanization of pro-
duction. In 2010, the 0.2 percentage points of under-industrialization generated
by subsidies is distributed as 1.0 percentage points less employment in urban areas
and 0.8 percentage points more employment in rural non-agriculture. The overall
4.0 percentage points of under-industrialization is distributed as 3.4 percentage
points under-urbanization and 0.6 percentage points under-employment in rural
non-agriculture. This illustrates the ambiguity in the net distortion of the rural
non-agricultural employment that we discussed in section 4. Overall, the distor-
tions due to the land policy dominate the allocations but social subsidies still play
an important role. Their main contribution is to generate more employment in
rural non-agriculture, which slows down the process of urbanization.
5.3 Other labour market wedges
Some authors have argued that migrants are either discriminated against or have
skills that are not suited to the ones required in urban locations, so insuffi cient
earnings is a major barrier to migration from rural to urban areas. It is not pos-
sible with the data available for China to identify the source of lower earnings for
migrants, whether it is due to discrimination or heterogeneity, but lower earnings
on average is frequently documented in the empirical literature (see for example
Meng and Zhang, 2001; Frijters, Kong and Meng, 2011; Démurger et al., 2009).
This is an immigration barrier that we did not take into account in our model,
in which the migration condition guarantees earnings equality. In this section
we recalculate the impact of the land and social subsidy policies on immigration
when there is an exogenous labour market wedge for immigrants that contributes
to the observed productivity differences between agricultural and non-agricultural
labour. The purpose is to check the robustness of our findings to the existence of
this wedge, which leads to a constrained-effi cient outcome in the absence of the
hukou restrictions.
We follow the standard approach in the development literature by introducing
an exogenous labour market wedge that lowers the non-agricultural wages earned
by agricultural hukou holders to µwi, i = r, u, with µ ∈ (0, 1) . In other words,
a migrant receives only a fraction µ of the urban wages received by workers with
urban hukou. We show in Appendix 7.5 that this generalizes the mobility condition
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(33) in an intuitive way, to:
βpaAa (l/na)


















































These conditions collapse to (33)-(36) when µ = 1. In the absence of land and
subsidy policy (π = σ = 1), the migration condition (33) implies that the exoge-
nous µ is a labour market wedge that prevents equality of the value of marginal
product of labour across sectors.
We assume the observed employment allocations are those that come out of the
model with µ ∈ (0, 1) and the two policies. All parameters are calibrated as before
and the new parameter µ is set to match the productivity gap between agriculture
and non-agriculture when λ and σ take the values reported in Table 1 for each
year (see Appendix 7.5 for more details). The productivity gap is defined as the
ratio of nominal labour productivity in non-agriculture to agriculture. This ratio
is obtained from combining nominal GDP for agriculture and non-agriculture from
the Chinese Statistic Yearbook with the sectoral employment shares in Figure 1.
The computed ratio increased from 3.9 in 1998 to 4.1 in 2004 and fell to 3.1 in
2010. The implied µ values are 0.26, 0.23 and 0.24, respectively, for each of the
three years.
Given the computed parameter values, we then use equations (44) and (43) to
calculate (with µ taking its computed values) the employment allocations when the
rental market for land is effi cient (π = 1) and there is no hukou-based discrimina-
tion in subsidies (σ = 1). This delivers the “second-best,”or “constrained-effi cient”
employment allocations. We then derive the impact of the land policy and the so-
cial subsidization by comparing the predicted employment allocations to the sec-
ond best allocation. Table 2 shows that our results about the over-employment in
agriculture and the under-employment in urban production, relative to the second-
best allocations, are similar to those in Table 1, except that social subsidies have a
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larger effect on urbanization. The reason for this change follows from the way the
wedge µ changes the migration condition, from (33) to (42): since migrants care
about the cost of the social subsidies, which comes out of their income, they care
about the ratio of this cost to their wage income, so the parameter that picks up
the impact of the subsidies changes from 1 − (1− σ) when they earn as much as
local hukou holders to 1−(1− σ) /µ when they earn only µ as much. Looking also
at the column that shows the implicit policy income loss shows that social subsi-
dies cause a much larger implicit income loss (as a percentage of their earnings)
than was the case in Table 1.
By construction, the three barriers together, µ, λ, and su, account for the entire
productivity gap between agriculture and non-agriculture. It is possible to use
our results to decompose the gap into the contribution of each barrier, following
the same methodology as in the employment allocations. This is shown in the
last column of Table 2. The computed ratios show that the over-employment in
agriculture induced by the land policy and the social subsidies can account for
about half (3.9 − 1.9)/3.9 of the productivity ratio in 1998, with most of it due
to the land policy. By 2010, the land policy still accounts for about a quarter
(2.9 − 2.1)/3.1 of the productivity ratio, with an additional 7 percent (0.2/3.1)
due to social subsidies. These results show that the hukou-based land policy and
social services contribute a substantial part of the productivity gap due to the
misallocation of employment.
6 Conclusion
We have shown that the two main components of the hukou household registration
system, the allocation of land cultivation rights to rural residents and the entitle-
ment to social subsidies in the area of registration, lead to over-employment in
agriculture and under-employment in the urban non-agricultural sector, whereas
the rural non-agricultural sector is subject to a negative influence from the land
policy and positive from the social subsidies, which might offset each other. The
land distortions arise from the fact that the absence of tenure guarantees, which in
its extreme form is summarized by the statement “use it or lose it”, lead (endoge-
nously in our paper) to imperfect rental markets, with a market-clearing rental
rate below the marginal product of land. In the comparison of migrant incomes
from rural and urban activities this leads to a discount on the effective income
in urban activities by up to 50% (when compared to an effi cient rental market),
which is the reason that migrants under-estimate the social benefits from migra-
tion.26 This ineffi ciency can be corrected by guaranteeing the security of tenure
26Of course, this claim has a dual, as summarized in our introduction, according to which
farmers under-estimate the opportunity cost of land.
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to farmers. Extending full entitlement to social services to migrants (the “floating
workers”) corrects the distortions due to the local entitlement restrictions of social
transfers.
Our results are derived from a model that has strong qualitative implications
and quantitative properties that depend on a small number of parameters. We
show that land policy is the main channel through which the hukou system dis-
torts both urbanization and industrialization. The social subsidies are small by
comparison, and although they have an impact on urbanization and the growth of
rural enterprises, their impact on industrialization is less. Generalizing from our
findings, we would argue that the absence of effi cient rental markets discourages
the growth of large agricultural enterprises and reduces the incentives to mechanize
agriculture, which is a current problem in China (World Bank, 2014).
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7 Appendix
7.1 Equilibrium in three sectors with government subsidies









j ; j = r, u (45)











We first derive the employment allocation across rural and urban non-agriculture.
Aggregating the MRS condition (27) with the weight of each type of consumer and









Substituting the relative price of the two goods from (33) into the aggregate MRS












(1− husu)−η ≡ Xσ−η. (48)
By definition, nr + nu = 1− na, which yields the rural and urban non-agricultural
employment shares in (34).




































Aggregating it with the weight of each type of consumer and making use of the
market clearing conditions (46) and (45):
Aal






















































Rearrange to obtain the equilibrium condition for the agriculture employment
share in (36).
7.2 Planner’s problem
The planner’s problem is to choose labour and land allocation to maximize the
utility of a representative agent subject to the production technologies
max
na,nr,nu,la
















; cj = Ajnj; j = r, n
nala ≤ l
na + nr + nu ≤ 1
As land is only used in agriculture, it must be that la = l/na. Thus the problem
is transformed to choosing labour allocation to solve:
max
na,nr,nu,la













1−β; cj = Ajnj; j = r, u
na + nr + nu ≤ 1








= ξ j = a, r, u, (54)
which states that the value of marginal product of labour must be equalized across
all sectors. Equation (54) together with the production functions can be used to
derive the optimal employment allocations.
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which together with the labour resource constraint imply the employment alloca-
tions in (38).





























































Finally substituting the production function for ca and equilibrium nu in (38) we
obtain the equilibrium condition for agriculture employment share in (39).
7.3 Constructing su
We obtained data for social spending in urban areas as a percentage of non-
agricultural value added (denoted Zu below). The model requires su, social spend-
ing as a percentage of urban value added, and we explain here how it can be
computed in the model’s equilibrium.









From (33), we get,












Substitution from (61) into (60) yields,
Zu =
su
1 + (1− husu)nr/nu
(62)
Formula (62) contains observables except for the unknown su and we use it to
compute the time series for su.
7.4 Computing the effi cient allocation
Given a value for c̄a/ya in a given year, we use (36) to compute the implied pref-
















The parameter ω derived from this is assumed to hold in all years in the sample,
being a fixed preference parameter. Given ω, rearranging (63) once again and



















Together with (41), we can use (40) to compute n∗at for any observed agriculture
employment share nat and a given value of λ.
7.5 Model with other labour market wedges
Wages in non-agricultural sectors are wj = µpjAj, j = r, u, so the migration
conditions across agriculture and rural non-agriculture in (28) become,
[1− λ (1− β)] paAa (l/na)1−β = µprAr, (65)
which, making use of the π notation, immediately gives the first equality of (42).
The mobility condition across rural non-agriculture and urban non-agriculture
is
µprAr + prsryr − Tr = µpuAu − Tu. (66)
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The urban employment share is still (hu +m) so the government budget con-
straints are the same as in (30) and (31). Substitution of those into (66) gives
the second equality in (42). Finally, employment shares (43) and (44) follow from
substituting the mobility condition (42) into the aggregate MRS conditions (47)
and (51).





nr/nu + (1− husu/µ)−1
nr/nu + 1
prAr, (67)
where the last equality follows from the migration condition across sectors r and
u in (42). Thus, the ratio of labour productivity across agricultural and non-











which implies an unique value of µ given data on (NAP/AP, nr/nu) and parame-
ters (β, λ, husu) , all of which are observable.
7.6 Data
The employment shares (na, nr, nu) are from Brandt and Zhu (2010). The nominal
value-added of non-agriculture (pnyn) is the sum of secondary and tertiary nominal
value-added reported by the NBS. The share of urban hukou hu is from Chan
(2012), who compiled the number from Chinese Statistical Yearbooks and China
Population Statistical yearbooks. It is available from 1970 to 2000 at five-year
intervals, then annually from 2001 to 2010.
The social spending data are constructed using a large number of offi cial sources
including Educational Statistical Yearbook of China, China Health Statistical Year-
book, Ministry of Finance (MOF) webpage, Finance Yearbook of China, China Civil
Affairs’Statistical Yearbook and China Statistical Yearbook. We include all social
service costs related to hukou (World Bank 2014, chapter 3) including education,
health care services, pensions, and other social assistance programs (e.g., basic
living subsidies). We collected detailed data of government spending for urban
and rural areas respectively. The main components are:
Education —This corresponds to the category "Government Appropriation for
Education" from the Educational Statistical Yearbook of China. For the rural
education we included only the spending for 9 years of compulsory education and
we derived the urban education spending by subtracting the rural spending from
the total government spending on education.
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Health —The data are from the China Health Statistical Yearbook. The total
government spending on health is the fiscal budget appropriation for health from
governments at all levels. However, we only have separate data for rural and
urban areas on total health spending, which includes altogether the spending from
the government, social entities and individuals. We therefore assume that the
distribution of rural and urban spending is the same in total health spending and
in government health spending.
Pensions —For rural areas, this variable denotes the government subsidies on
the New Rural Pension System (for rural residents) from the MOF webpage. For
urban areas, it denotes the government subsidies on the Urban Enterprise Basic
Pension Insurance (for workers with urban hukou) and Urban Residents Social
Pension Insurance (for non-employed residents with urban hukou), from the Fi-
nance yearbook of China and MOF Webpage.
Other Urban Welfare —This is government spending on Unemployment Insur-
ance, Work Injury Insurance and Maternity Insurance, which local urban hukou
employees are eligible for. The data are extracted from the Finance yearbook of
China and MOF webpage.
Basic Living Subsidies —This variable includes basic living standard subsidies
for urban and rural areas, from the China Civil Affairs’Statistical Yearbook.
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Source: Brandt and Zhu (2010).  
 
Notes: Figure 1 presents employment shares of the agricultural sector and the non-agricultural 
sector, with the non-agricultural sector divided into rural non-agricultural and the urban non-


























































































































year      λ  su  1 na  nu  nr 
1998  efficient  1  0  0.0  37.1  35.4  27.5 
   land policy  0  0  49.0  +7.9  ‐4.5  ‐3.4 
hu=25%  full policy  0  4.5  49.6  +8.0  ‐4.8  ‐3.2 
                   
2004  efficient  1  0  0.0  32.1  41.5  26.4 
   land policy  0.2  0  43.5  +6.9  ‐4.2  ‐2.7 
hu =30%  full policy  0.2  5.5  44.4  +7.0  ‐4.8  ‐2.2 
                   
2010  efficient  1  0  0.0  21.8  49.0  29.2 
   land policy  0.6  0  27.8  +3.8  ‐2.4  ‐1.4 




Table 2: Impact of Policy in the presence of other labour market distortions 
 
 
      Policy income  Agriculture  Urban non‐  Rural non‐  Productivity
      loss (%)  (%)   agriculture (%)  agriculture (%)  Ratio   
year       1 1   na  nu  nr  NAP/AP  
1998  constrained‐efficient  0.0  38.6  35.5  25.9  1.9 
μ=0.26  land policy  49.0  +6.2  ‐3.6  ‐2.6  3.8 
   full policy   51.2  +6.5  ‐4.9  ‐1.6  3.9 
                    
2004  constrained‐efficient  0.0  32.4  43.2  24.4  2.2 
μ=0.23  land policy  43.5  +6.1  ‐3.9  ‐2.2  4.0 
   full policy  47.5  +6.7  ‐6.4  ‐0.3  4.1 
                    
2010  constrained‐efficient  0.0  21.8  52.0  26.2  2.1 
μ=0.24  land policy  27.8  +3.3  ‐2.2  ‐1.1  2.9 
   full policy  35.3  +4.0  ‐6.5  +2.5  3.1 
 
 
Note: λ, hu and su take the same values as in Table 1. Policy income loss is the percentage of 
implicit income loss relative to the second-best. Productivity ratio is the ratio of nominal labour 
productivity in non-agriculture (NAP) to agriculture (AP).   
